Provides a systematic assessment of FSB operations, from standard setting to implementation review in order to identify the power wielded by government networks in global financial governance.
Develops a novel theory of legislative reluctance as a limit to the power of government networks, showing its strong inferential leverage in comparison with a variety of competing explanations drawn from economics, political science, and law.
Engages in the debate on the role of government networks in global governance with a well-founded but controversial argument that questions the role of national parliaments in managing global economic affairs in the public interest.
Suggests a novel institutional solution to the effectiveness-legitimacy dilemma that global governance forums face, combining the advantages of functional specialization and electoral accountability.
Peter Knaack is an Adjunct Professorial Lecturer at the School of International Service at American University, in Washington, DC, USA. He also serves as a senior research fellow at the Global Economic Governance Programme at the University of Oxford, UK; as a research associate at the Centre for Sustainable Finance at SOAS University of London, UK; and an associate at the Council on Economic Policies, a Swiss think tank. His research focuses on global financial governance. He has written and published on the political economy of global financial standard-setting, digital financial inclusion, green finance, and China's financial system.
Title: Global Financial Networked Governance: The Power of the Financial Stability Board and its Limits (RIPE Series in Global Political Economy)
Author: Knaack, Peter
ISBN: 9781032268071
Binding:
Publisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd
Publication Date: 2022-12-30
Number of Pages: 214
Weight: 0.3501 kg